The
Combat History of the
10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg"
Chapter 1
Page 4
Organization
and Training
1943-1944
Shortly before the divisional commander received his new assignment in Finland to command the 6th SS-Gebirgs-Division "Nord", Debes prepared a second detailed memo that quantified the fruits of his labor, or lack thereof. His hopes of creating a division of political soldiers were dashed; this was an aspect of training in which the company grade officers clearly failed him. To this end, Debes emphatically ordered two series of lectures that covered "German history" and "Our Enemies", the same classes he specifically addressed earlier in his memo from July. As before, he outlined the goal of each lecture that was pure propaganda in nature, but this time identified Germany's enemies that included the British, Americans, Jews and Bolsheviks. Finally, Debes skillfully placed the onus on every officer to ensure for the political indoctrination of every SS man. Directives from the chief of the indoctrination office (Abt.VI) that followed on the heels of the Debes-memos ordered a repeat of the basic classes, indicating the indoctrination program was a complete failure. Indeed, the 7 December memo from the Propaganda Branch VI reported that the companies were not teaching the prescribed topics (ordered by the division).61
Interestingly, Werner Pietzka and Bernhard Westerhoff, both enlisted members of the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10, confirmed the absence of indoctrination training. When asked about the training, Westerhoff vehemently denied ever receiving such training and considered himself "a soldier just like others too" (referring to the army). He added, "The important aspect of the training revolved around learning how to fight and stay alive." In comparison, Pietzka touched on every key aspect of the training, as it related to the instruction for "Our Enemies," stating it was the same material he learned while in the Hitler Jugend. Otto Jacob, a member of a self-propelled 105mm Wespe battery of the artillery regiment, clearly recalls significant amounts of instruction that primarily focused on the reason for the war, such as the Treaty of Versailles and the Allied bombing of German cities. Jacob remarked,
"The more complex issues went in one ear and out the other. No one ever questioned anything out of fear of embarrassment. We were so young. The fact that the Allies were bombing Germany and killing innocent civilians enraged us."62
The Generalkommando SS Panzerkorps that deployed to the east in February 1943 returned to France in December and organized as the Generalkommando II SS Panzerkorps, under the command of SS-Obergruppenführer (SS General) Paul "Papa" Hausser.63
Lothar Debes commanded the division for less than one year, from 15 February until 15 November 1943, when he relinquished command to SS Lieutenant General Karl von Treuenfeld. Treuenfeld was a veteran officer from World War I with exceptional experience that included a close relationship with General Erich Ludendorff and posting as the Army confidant for the secret armaments programs in April 1939. Treuenfeld entered the SS on 1 May 1939 (SS no. 323,792) as an SS-Oberführer (SS Senior Colonel). For a brief period of twenty days, he assumed the post as Chief of Staff of the Totenkopf-Verbände. From 1 July 1939 until 31 May 1940, Treuenfeld took assignment as the Inspector of the SS Junkerschulen. He transferred to the staff of the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich" where, in June, he earned the clasp to the Iron Cross Second Class during the campaign in the west. On 9 November 1940, Treuenfeld was promoted to SS Lieutenant General and became the Department Chief for Officer Training at the Main SS office in Berlin. One month after his return to a combat unit on 5 April 1941, as the commander of the 2nd SS Infantry Brigade (mot), Treuenfeld was involved in an automotive accident that crushed his chest cavity and pinched the nerves along his neck at the fourth and sixth vertebrae. Treuenfeld returned to duty in January 1942 as Befehlshaber (commander) der Waffen-SS in Böhmen-Mähren of the Sudetenland. Böhmen-Mähren was the Protectorate, while Sudetenland was a Reich territory. On 5 July 1942, Treuenfeld assumed command of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade (mot) and posted lastly as the Höhere SS- u. Polizeiführer Rußland Süd (higher SS and police commander southern Russia) before he joined the Frundsberg Division.64
In December 1943, the 1st Pioneer Company received their armored half-tracks. Shortly thereafter, training for the entire company began in the mounting and dismounting of vehicles and the operational deployment of troops in the field. A fatal accident occurred during hand grenade training when a platoon commander inadvertently dropped a grenade in a vehicle and threw the pin. In an effort to shield others from the blast, the commander threw himself on the grenade.65
Hermann Max
Gerhard, an SS volunteer, was born on 10 May 1925 in Paunsdorf, a suburb of
Leipzig in the region of Saxony. In 1938, at the impressionable young age
of 14 and a member of the Hitler Jugend, Gerhard experienced, first hand,
the first official visit by Adolf Hitler to the city of Leipzig. Among the
thousands of cheering people and waving flags, the smart-looking, black-uniformed
regiment of the SS-Leibstandarte, leading the motorcade through the streets,
inspired Gerhard. He hoped that some day he could be one of them. At seventeen
years of age, but against the will of his father, Gerhard volunteered for
the Waffen-SS and joined the 4th SS Polizei Division. Despite volunteering,
Gerhard did so but with mixed emotions. Foremost, he wanted to make a personal
contribution to the war. On the other hand, he wanted the war to end as soon
as possible to stop people from suffering. On 9 November 1942, in the Polish
village of Dubica, at the foot of the Carpathian Mountains, Gerhard swore
allegiance to Hitler,
"I swear to you, Adolf Hitler, my leader, fidelity and courage. I promise
you, and all those whom you choose to command me, obedience unto death, so
help me God."
At the conclusion of his training in 1943 as a gunner for the MG-42, Gerhard transferred with his machine gun team to the 2nd regiment of the 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. After experiencing their first combat and Russian winter around Wolgorod, the team transferred to Berlin where they joined SS First Lieutenant Otto Skorzeny in the Sonderverband Friedenthal (special commando). After six months of service, Gerhard was promoted to Private. In May 1943, Gerhard participated in Operation Schwarz (black), the unsuccessful search for the Balkan guerilla chief Josip Broz, or "Marshal Tito," in Yugoslavia. Wounded in the leg, Gerhard was reassigned to an escort command for a Red Cross train until he arrived at a hospital. After his medical release, Gerhard reported to the SS signal barracks at Nürnberg in July 1943, and subsequently received orders to a small Sicherheitsdienst (SD) detachment in southern France at Saint Palais. Upon his arrival, Gerhard was promoted to the NCO rank of SS Senior Corporal. After the death of his commanding officer, killed by a road-side car bomb, Gerhard transferred to the II./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.22, located in Gardanne. He assumed command of the radio section of the II Battalion and, before the year's end, commandeered to the SS-Nachrichtenführerschule (signal officer school) in Metz.66
In the mean time, infantry and tank training continued for the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 once they assumed quarters in the monastery Le Bec-Hellion. The single Pz.Kpfw.III was replaced with a Sturmgeschütz III. Sometime between Christmas and the new year, Schneider was ordered to take twelve men to Magdeburg-Königsborn and accept delivery of new tanks. Schneider recalls,
"Our Spieß (company sergeant) made sure we had ample supplies so that we could spend several pleasurable days in Magdeburg. Considering that the delivery of our tanks would take some time, our section transport chief, TFK Kruwe, decided to go home for several days. Much to our surprise, 22 tanks were already waiting for us to take delivery! The first and most important task was to acquire a transportation number; it was also required to report the foreseen route over which the tanks would travel. The drivers, radio operators, and gunners all took their positions as young women from the factory drove the tanks over the ramps onto rail cars. Once everything was packed and tied down, the trip back to France began. Despite the efforts of French railroad personnel that tried to unhook one of the tanks, all 22 tanks were delivered to the company. A big reception and celebration ensued."67
The "Spieß" or Spiess was the proverbial mother of the company. He was responsible for the everyday administration, order, and welfare of the unit. As a senior enlisted man, the Spiess usually bore the rank of Army Hauptfeldwebel or SS-Hauptscharführer (Master Sergeant). The Spiess was recognized easily by the thick notebook he attached between the front tunic buttons, and the "piston rings" or "tress" (silver bullion fabric) around the tunic sleeve-cuffs. The TFK or Technischer Führer Kraftfahrzeugwesen translates to the "Technical Motor Vehicle Officer." Generally, the TFK was a vehicle engineer who was responsible for the vehicles of a larger unit, such as a battalion or regiment. The rank of a TFK was usually a Captain or First Lieutenant. The rank and billet of Schirrmeister originates from the period when horses and the use of horse-drawn vehicles were used in the military. "Geschirr" referred to the leather used to hitch the vehicles to the horses. The term, however, evolved to incorporate additional technical aspects of soldiering. The Schirrmeister was responsible for the technical matters of a unit, usually a Staff NCO.68
Individual and "man and tank" training concluded before the new year. This phase taught the men, for example, how to escape from the tank, in the case of an emergency. A small hatch in the floor of the vehicle provided the exit. For this exercise, the instructors often selected areas where the ground was soft and the actual ground clearance very low.69
In order to enhance morale and marksmanship interest within the division, Treuenfeld established the Frundsberg sniper badge, which could be awarded and worn by NCOs and troops. Represented by a white whistle cord, instead of the standard black color, the cord attached from the second front tunic button (from the top) to the right breast pocket. A certificate accompanied the cord when the prescribed six marksmanship sniper requisites were successfully completed, in the field, within a period of one month. The requirements for the award included three hits out of five shots at 200 meters against a cranium target visible for five seconds; four hits out of five shots at 200 meters against a cranium target wearing a gas mask; three hits out of five shots at 300 meters against a moving (from left to right or vice versa) side-view motorcycle messenger target; two hits out of three shots at 100 meters against a kneeling rifleman target at night using white illumination flares; three hits out of five shots at 150 meters against a machine gun target at dawn; and three hits out of five shots at 100 meters against a moving aerial target visible for two minutes.70
During the first several days in January 1944, the SS Assault Gun Battalion 10 (Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung) disbanded. In accordance with the special regimental order 1/44, ten self-propelled assault guns (Sd.Kfz.142) from the respective 1st, 2nd and 3rd Batteries transferred to the II Battalion to form the 7th and 8th Companies. An assortment of trucks was distributed to the regimental and battalion staffs, whereby each assault gun company was left with eight light and seven medium trucks. A number of trucks and equipment transferred to the I "Panther" Battalion as well.71
On two separate occasions, Hans-Dieter Sauter, the self-propelled artillery Adjutant of the I Battalion, requested leave to get married. Sander, the regimental officer, declined the approval on both occasions, stating that no more than three officers were permitted absent at one time. However, Sauter received permission to marry in January 1944, when the self-propelled I Battalion was training at Mailly-le-Camp, attached to the tank regiment. The battalion commander (Jobst) and SS First Lieutenant Franz Kleffner, the regimental tank commander, were both former members of the LAH. Jobst explained Sauter's situation to Kleffner who granted permission immediately. Shortly thereafter, Sauter was relieved as battery commander. When the regimental adjutant Heinzelmann aspired to become a General Staff officer, Sander requested a replacement from the SS main office. SS First Lieutenant Walter Behrens, from the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking" arrived as a replacement. When Heinzelmann was unable to pass the entrance examination and returned to the artillery regiment, he assumed his old duties whereby Behrens became the 1st Battery Officer. In April 1944, Sauter assumed temporary command of the 3rd battery when the eastward bound train car that carried the battery commander, SS First Lieutenant Genz, and a number of NCOs, inadvertently was hitched to the wrong train heading in the wrong direction.72
After the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 received its full compliment of men, the company relocated to Le Neubourg and continued combat training. Vehicle numbers were applied to the tank turrets. During the end of January, the 6th Company relocated southwest of Paris to the troop training facility Maille Le Camp where larger formation training began. First as a group, it comprised two tanks. As a platoon, two groups were consisted of four tanks plus the platoon commander. Finally, a company comprised four platoons and Company troops. The prerequisite for effective training was a comprehensive understanding in the use of the radio. Bernhard Westerhoff recalls this evolution of the training to have been a jovial experience that brought out the best in the men. Tank training was rounded out with loading and gunnery training. Target locations were given based on their position on a clock: "Three o'clock, solitary oak, three mils right, enemy anti-tank!" Teamwork, well-defined and speedy target acquisitions was half the success. Later, the lives of the men would depend on it.73
During an exercise in the loading and reloading of armor piercing ammunition, the tank commander Schneider gave perfect target coordinates. Using the electronic firing device, one armor-piercing round fired from the barrel with a sharp bang. Despite thorough training, the recoil of the main gun caused Westerhoff to be thrown completely from the turret. As a result, Schneider was severely reprimanded.74
Larger battalion and regimental-sized training exercises were completed that focused on tank operations coordinated with the Luftwaffe and other supporting units. For the week around 8 February 1944, the II SS Panzer Corps, comprising the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, conducted a large scale training exercise with the Luftwaffe. SS Lieutenant General Paul Hausser led the exercise, whereas General Guderian, SS Colonel Kurt Meyer, as well as other Army officers attended from nearby units. The exercise served to gauge the combat readiness of both divisions; it received high praise from General Guderian.75
The nearly complete training of the division gave tribute to the achievements of the officers and NCOs of the cadre. However, the training phases lacked essential equipment. Supply shortages and the effects of war forced units to rely on a mixed bag of vehicles for transportation. In turn, the training for mechanics was more complex and time consuming. The repair of a variety of vehicles required a larger stock and source of spare parts. For example, the company inventory of vehicles prepared by SS-Oberscharführer (SS Staff Sergeant) and Schirrmeister Kautz, 5./SS-Pz.Rgt.10., exemplifies the dilemma with four British Triumph motorcycles, of which one had gear problems; four light Volkswagen (VW) and one Opel-Kadett cars, of which three VWs were unserviceable; one heavy Army Steyr-made automobile; one light French-made Citroen truck with engine damage; half of the six American Ford V-8 medium trucks were unserviceable; one unserviceable Czechoslovakian Skoda-manufactured truck with steering problems; one unserviceable Opel-Blitz truck with a bad cylinder block; and two Army Maultier (half-track trucks); one light Saurer-produced prime mover; nine Steyr Pz.Kfw.IV, of which two were being serviced; and 11 Allkett-produced Pz.Kfw.IV, of which six had replacement engines.76
On 22 February 1944, the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 left Maille Le Camp and returned to Normandy where they quartered in a castle in Pont Authou. At the end of March, the men of the pioneer company, SS-Pz.Rgt.10, returned to their quarters at Berville after laying mines and building obstacles at Dieppe. Protective vehicle ramparts were dug for the Ford trucks and armored half-tracks, and Panzerfäuste (bazookas or rocket launchers) were distributed to the men. The end of March signaled the completion of the training. The strength of the division included 487 officers, 2,722 NCOs, and 16,104 men totaling 19,313 soldiers. For the men of the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10, the distribution of large quantities of ammunition generated rumors of a deployment to the east, a movement confirmed on 30 March 1944. The division loaded onto trains in the area of Lisieux-Bernay and arrived in Lemberg on 2 April.77
Franz Holtrichter was a radio troop officer assigned to the staff of the III Battalion, SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.22. On 29 March, the battalion vehicles were staged at the railroad station in Mecidon, France. The driver of Holtrichter's vehicle, de Paris, was from the Elsaß and asked for permission to see his French friends and bid them farewell. Holtrichter referred him to the transport officer. Around the same time when the vehicles were loaded onto the train, de Paris managed to disappear. Without his driver, Holtrichter drove the VW Kübelwagen onto the train himself. As the time of departure neared with no sign of de Paris, Holtrichter reported the matter to the transport officer who held the train for an additional 30 minutes. In accordance with regulations, drivers were required to remain with their vehicles at all times. Since de Paris was absent without authorization, Holtrichter remained with the vehicle. Most everyone else was required to ride in the closed cars, which were modified to accommodate troops. An Allied bombing attack killed all the men in the rail cars. Holtrichter and other drivers managed to crawl under their vehicles during a second attack run. Moreover, the vehicles left the railroad station and parked in a nearby open field in order to avoid additional aerial attacks. After briefly attaching themselves to an accompanying Flak Squadron, the drivers received marching orders to the Training and Replacement Battalion "Brünn." Upon arrival, the drivers were issued new clothing and 10 days special furlough, which allowed Holtrichter to spent Easter Sunday at home. After time with the family, approximately 25 men from the original 180 men that survived the bombing attack of met back at Brünn.78
In review, the 1943-pattern panzer division consisted of nearly 20,000 men. The majority of the men were volunteers that came, primarily, from outside the German borders. The cadre was the heart and sole of the division. Combat veterans of exceptional quality filled the officer ranks. Their battlefield prowess transformed the entire division into an elite formation and ready for action.
Notes
61. 10.SS-Panzer-Division "Frundsberg", 25.11.1943, Betrifft: Politische-weltanschauliche Führung, NA/RG242/T354/R150/F3791876-3791877; and a memo from the Chief of the Abt.VI, 7.12.1943, Betrifft: Weltanschauliche Führung und Truppenbetreuung, F3791874-3791875. No other correspondence was found that would suggest Debes did not take political indoctrination very seriously.
62. Based on interviews conducted on 30 and 31 Jan 2005, with Bernhard Westerhoff, Werner Pietzka, and Otto Jacob, regarding the frequency and content of indoctrination training. The phrase "Soldier just like others" was coined by Paul Hausser and used in 1966 for the title of his book.
63. Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, 1. Paul Hausser was a professional soldier and veteran of World War I. He gained the respect and admiration of all the Germans soldiers. After the war, he defended the Waffen-SS against accusations of war crimes during the Nuremberg Trials. For a summary concerning the life and times of Paul Hausser, see E.G. Krätschmer, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS , 4. ergänzte Auflage (fourth revised edition (Coburg: Nation Europa Verlag GmbH, 1999), 158-181.
64. Karl v. Treuenfeld, service record dossier, NA/RG242/A3343/SSO-0189B/F908-909. No information is available that indicates where Treuenfeld resided between 5 July 1941 and January 1942.
65. Pionier Kameradschaft "Dresden", Chronik der Pioniereinheiten, 8-9. Standard 1-ton armored half-tracks (s.Kfz.232) were equipped with pairs of bridging sections and stored on the tops of vehicles. Every group received two half-group vehicles, each with pioneer equipment and two MG42 machine guns. When dismounted, the assistant driver operated one MG42 that remained on the vehicle for security.
66. Hermann Max Gerhard, My Life in the Middle of the 20th Century, unpublished manuscript, (Flagstaff: privately printed, 1997), 1, 12-13, and 21-30. The MG42 machine gun was a crew-served weapon and the best in its class. Its cyclic rate of fire was more that 2500 rounds per minute. In February 1944, SS Officer Candidate (Junker) Gerhard returned to the 2nd Battalion, SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.22, as the Funktruppführer (signal troop officer).
67. Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 26.
68. Information provided to the author by Klaus Ewald of Siek, transcript Stenger Archive, 7 July 2005. Klaus Ewald was a motorcycle messenger in the Hitler Youth Division.
69. Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 32.
70. See the article by Patrick Agte, "Scharfschützenabzeichen der 10.SS-Panzerdivision "Frundsberg," Der Freiwillige, no. 4 (2005): 6-7. In the event that a sniper did not successfully complete individual segments of the shooting requirement during the first attempt, a second attempt was permissible.
71. The main purpose of disbaning the assault gun battalion was to fill the gaps in the regimental tank battlions. The I "Panther" Battalion did not yet exist, and the II Battalion only had two companies of Pz.Kfw.IVs. The assault guns filled the ranks of the remaining two 7th and 8th Companies. See SS-Pz.Rgt.10, Abt.V, Kfz.Sb. 1/44, Uebernahme der Sturm-Geschütz-Abteilung,, 1.7.44, NA/RG242/T354/R152/F3796020-3796023; and Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 32. Officers and NCOs from the disbanded SS-Stu.Gesch.Abt.10 were distributed throughout the companies of the II./Pz.Rgt.10. Westerhoff reported that four men joined the 6th Company. However, the II Battalion directive 7/44, dated 8 Jan 1944, ordered that 44 officers and NCOs transfer to the 6th Company.
72. SS Second Lieutenant Hans-Dietrich Sauter, "Querschuesse und Intrigen?", Die Hellebarde, Nr. 21 (2001): 35-36.
73. Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 34.
75. Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 35-39, and Pz.Rgt.10, Ib., Personal-Befehl 19/44, 14.2.44, NA/RG242/T354/R152/F3795958-3795961. Twenty-two additional men from the II Battalion transferred to the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Götz von Berlichingen."
76. 5./SS-Pz.Rgt.10, 1.3.1944, Übergabe-Verhandlung, NA/RG242/T354/R152/F3794742 and 3794751.
77. A report by Erich Werkmeister contained in the Pionier Kameradschaft "Dresden", Chronik der Pioniereinheiten, 10; and Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 39. Also see: Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, 11.
78. Franz Holtrichter, Die Hellebarde, Nr. 14, 1991, 102. Holtrichter believed de Paris to have been in contact with the French Resistance and therefore responsible for the attack.
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