The Combat History of the
10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg"

Chapter 2

Commitment in the East, Winter 1944

At the end of March 1944, snow and cold greeted the 10th SS Panzer Division in the northern Ukraine. In stark contrast to France, where the first blossoms already sprouted, traces of spring had not yet emerged. The men of the division arrived in the devastated streets of Lemberg after the long railroad journey and awaited orders. After the divisional convoys formed, one unit after another rolled out of Lemberg.

Galizien centered itself between the cities of the Austrian capital of Wien in the east, Polish Warschau in the north, the Russian city of Kiev in the west and the Rumanian capital of Bucharest in the south. The Carpathian mountains arch from the southwestern base of the Weichsel River southeast to the mouth of the Donau south of Odessa. Galizien was formed within the Polish Republic but acquired by Austria during the first partition of Poland in 1772. After World War I, Galizien was returned to the Poles and formed the district of the general Polish government in 1944. A neglected region of 4.5 million people, Lemberg was the third largest city with 350,000 inhabitants who were poor. The majority of the people were Ukrainians and after the war in 1918, ethnic tension with the Poles lasted until the Soviets occupied the region in 1939. Once the Soviets entered the region, forced deportations began and a three-year reign of terror. The Soviet NKVD murdered many Ukrainians and Poles. To help fight Bolshevism, men from the region volunteered by the thousands to form the 14th SS Freiwilligen-Division "Galizien" in April 1943.

In the wake of the Soviet encirclement of Kamenez-Polodsk and Tarnopol, Russian forces penetrated further west across the Strypa River and onto Buczacz. The II SS Panzer Corps faced the monumental task of safeguarding the General Government against the Soviets and relieving German forces trapped between the Dnjestr, Zbrutsch, and Strypa Rivers.1

The costly battles of Stalingrad, Tscherkassy, and Uman decidedly weakened German troops in the east. Although many units managed to break out of numerous encirclements and reach friendly lines, the lack of fuel accounted for the loss of large quantities of tanks and artillery. By mid-February 1944, the German situation along the Ukrainian front became untenable. Most of the Heeresgruppen reserves were exhausted and in a situation very similar to that in the First Panzer Army, commanded by Generaloberst Hans-Valentin Hube. Continuous fighting put the light divisions at a breaking point and the front lines, held by the infantry, were dangerously thin. The over-extended front of the First Panzer Army reached from the western Ukraine along a general line north of Winniza and Schepetowka, northeast of Tarnopol. The only area along the front that resembled German containment stretched between the Dnjepr River delta and Schepetowka. From Schepetowka to the Pripjet Marshes, General Arthur Hauffe's Nürnberger 13th Infantry Division held an 80 km gap and protected an entire Army Corps.2

General Hauffe assumed the sole responsibility of safeguarding the strategic and decisive corridor south of the Pripjet Marshes and the demanding task of preventing the Russians from closing the gap. The perilous situation became more acute after the 13th Soviet Army crossed the strategic Dnjepr-Pripjet triangle. Despite the efficiency of General Hauffe in delaying the Soviet advance, he was unable to stop it altogether. Thus, six Soviet armies stood at the corridor along the old Polish border near Rowno. The Russians reorganized in order to launch a new and decisive attack with strong tank concentrations, hoping to force a decision and cause the general collapse across the German southern front. The main goal was the isolation and destruction of Heeresgruppe South, after splitting it away from Heeresgruppe Center and pushing it against the Black Sea or Carpathian Mountains.

In the west, the Russians threatened the important western railhead at Kowel, bordering the Pripjet area, and concentrated a large force to attack General-Feldmarshal Erich von Manstein's northern flank. Based on personal visits to the sector of the LXIV Army Corps, Manstein repeatedly warned the Führerhauptquartier (Hitler's headquarters) about the possibility of a general collapse and requested additional forces for the formation of an army behind the threatened area of Rowno.

The Soviet armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which Marshal Ivan Stephanovich Konjew formed for earlier operations against the Korsun-pocket, opposed the German Eigth Army. After a brief respite, Soviet forces waited to resume the attack against weak German positions with limited armor. Moreover, the Germans lacked the forces that fought at the encirclement of Tscherkassy. Indeed, Marshal Konjew stood a good chance of reaching his goal; Belorussia-Rumania.3

Throughout the latter portion of 1943, the Soviet Stavka made good use of refinements to the operational art of war. Considered as the transitional year, the Soviets improved their tactical command and control through greater use of radios, vehicles, aircraft, and command points. Tactical defenses evolved from non-continuous to deep and dense trench systems, supported by increased fire support, which provided for greater security. Theoretically, the compression of the defense in width and supplementation of artillery in depth provided for a concentration of force. This approach proved ideal and effective against German armored counterattacks. Soviet defensive belts usually deployed a rifle corps, consisting of two rifle divisions, within the first belt, and one rifle division in the second. Each rifle division manned the defenses in one or two echelons, while rifle regiments deployed in two echelons. Group artillery, anti-tank regions comprised of fortified points, artillery antitank reserves, and mobile obstacle detachments provided support for each rifle regiment. The antitank defenses became more durable by deploying strong regions throughout the depth of the defense. First echelon counterattacks and reinforcements by mobile tank brigades or regiments, or self-propelled gun regiments of the rifle division reserve, were designed to restore any breaches within the defensive lines.4

Zhukov ordered the Soviet 1st Tank Army to strike against the Dnjestr in the direction of Tschernowitz. The Soviet 4th Tank Army was to regroup and consolidate until its infantry divisions caught up. To the listening Germans, it was clear that weak forces of the Soviet 4th Tank Army held the northern reaches of the Dnjestr, but only as long as its infantry divisions remained far behind. Additional radio intercepts indicated that Zhukov anticipated a German breakout to the south across the only remaining escape route at the Hotin bridgehead.

Soviet forces managed to gain control of all the major escape routes, four major tributaries to the west, and penetrate deep along the northern front of the pocket. While visiting Hitler at the Adlerhorst, Manstein received permission to breakout to the west. At the same time, Hitler attached the II SS Panzer Corps to the Fourth Panzer Army, in order for General Hube to attack out of the southwest region of Tarnopol. The SS corps consisted of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions from France, as well as the 100th Jäger Division from Hungary and the 367th Infantry Division.5

To rescue the twenty-two divisions, the First Panzer Army and the reinforced Fourth Panzer Army had to stabilize the front between the Carpathians and the Pripjet Marshes. The Eighth Army, next to the Sixth Army of Heeresgruppe A, provided security in Rumania while the Hungarian Army held the mountain passes through the Carpathians.

The pocket closed on 25 March 1944, trapping the First Panzer Army north of the Dnjestr. Once General Hube detected the Soviet center of gravity concentrating in the east and north, he shortened the front along a more defendable perimeter around Kamenez-Podolsk. Primarily, the reduced front allowed for a greater concentration of forces to defend against Soviet attacks. Second, it provided for a more efficient means to distribute the limited supplies along interior lines of communications. However, the Soviets assumed the Germans were in a headlong retreat and gave the First Panzer Army time to seal off any penetrations along the northeastern portion of the salient.

The Soviet advance in the south, termed by David M. Glantz, the author of When Titans Clash: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, as "freeing the Ukraine virtually without a halt", was rapid but hardly without pause. Marshal Zhukov planned to catch any German forces attempting to escape the encirclement with strong Soviet forces located along the Dnjestr south of Kamenez-Podolsk. Confident, Zhukov committed his entire 1st Tank Army and fast corps onto the southern bank of the Dnjestr and attacked Tschernowitz, Kolomea, and Stanislau. To that end, Zhukov removed his forces from the forward positions of the encirclement, a significant mistake in operational planning. He was thereafter unable to use his strength at the crucial moment in the north.6

Early German reports indicated that Gruppe Mauss, with its three divisions, almost linked with the Fourth Panzer Army and the 1st Panzer Division continued to hold the Eckpfeiler Gorodok. The LXIV Corps successfully captured the area around Frampol-Jarmolinzy and, while air support remained consistent, the 17th Panzer Division stood ready for an attack at Kamenez-Podolsk.

On the evening of 28 March, the First Panzer Army formed two groups to achieve their objective. In the north, Korpsgruppe Chevallerie received the objectives of covering the northern flank and, in conjunction with other forces, to establish a bridgehead across the Zbrucz to capture and hold open the larger crossings of the Seret. Korpsgruppe Breith, forming a wedge in the south, received the task of destroying the enemy in the area of Kamenez-Podolsk and breaking out across the Zbrucz at Okopy.

The next day, forward elements of the northern wedge broke across the Zbrucz River while elements of the 16th Panzer Division from Westfallen and the 17th Panzer Divisions from Thüringen rolled up enemy resistance. The now free 1st Panzer Division that followed took over positions of the XXIV Panzer Corps. Attacks by the southern group struck in full swing to the southwest. With help from elements of the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", the East Prussian 1st Infantry Division and 101th Jäger Division from Baden-Württemberg continued to hold their positions against Konjew's Second Ukrainian Front. Korpsgruppe Chevallerie secured bridgeheads across the Zbrucz and a bridge that remained intact at the Skala River. The first phase of the German relief succeeded by surprising the Soviets. Moreover, once Zhukov discovered his mistake, only one single Soviet tank corps employed into the decisive northern battle against the flank of the First Panzer Army, from the southern banks of the Dnjestr.7

General Hausser's staff of the II SS Panzer Corps arrived in Lemberg on 1 April. The corps also incorporated the heavy Panzer Battalion 506 and the second battalion of Panzer Battalion 23. The same day, warning orders alerted the individual units of their responsibilities, based on the 2 April Panzerarmeebefehl Nr.63 (tank army order), by the Fourth Panzer Army.

The II SS Panzer Corps received orders to surprise the enemy and drive him out of the line Rohatyn-Brzezany and to the southeast, destroy the enemy south of Podhajce and attack onto Buczacz, via Monasterzyska. The 367nd Infantry Division, arriving from the area Burcztyn-Rohatyn, was to join the SS Panzer Corps and capture the area of Wolczkow (seven km east of Jezupol)-Horozanka-Huilcze-Bolczowce. The secondary objective of the 367nd Infantry Division included supporting the eastward leading operations and providing security in the south along the Dnjster River. A panzer division was to attack forward via Brezezany and Podhajce and onto Monasterzyska, turning east to capture the sector along the Strypa River by Buczacz. The objective of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps was to support and protect eastward moving tank operations in the north, draw Russian forces away from the southern enemy wing and block the enemy moving southward from the east. In order for the corps to establish bridgeheads on either side of Zlotniki in the sector of the Strypa, the corps was to attack against the center of gravity on both sides of Podhajce. The 100th Jäger Division and the heavy Panzer Battalion 506 were to support the attack. Due to very small amounts of organic army pioneer equipment, all pioneers were directed to participate only in pioneer work. Once the breakout was underway, the II SS Panzer Corps would receive snow plows to clear the roads. The supply of the First Panzer Army consolidated in the area of Chodorow. Once contact was re-established between the spearheads of the relief force and the First Panzer Army, all supply units would assist to re-supply the units under close coordination with the II SS Panzer Corps.8

Among the transport trains that carried the units of the 10th SS Panzer Division to their destination between 1-5 April, the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 arrived in the vicinity of Zloczow, east of Lemberg, in the afternoon on 2 April. The village lay along the rail line Lemberg-Tarnopol. Lacking an off-ramp, the company was detrained using bails of hay brought from France. The commander of the 3rd platoon, Edmund Erhard recalls,

The company order of march was led by the 1st platoon, under the command of Quandel, followed by the 3rd platoon, commanded by Erhard. The company details followed, commanded by Westerhoff, and finally, the 2nd platoon under Schwemmlein. Wherever a problem arose, Leo Franke, the company commander, always surfaced in his Volkswagen accompanied by two motorcycle messengers. The company reached the bivouac area of Slowita by way of the villages Jasionowce, Lackie and Nowosiolki.10

The supply units of the 10th SS detrained in Lemberg and established supply points in the surrounding metropolitan area. Following the arrival of the SS Wirtschafts (Economy) Battalion 10, SS Major Schill immediately began baking operations. The bakers of the 1st Company, SS-Wi.Btn.10, were tasked on the first day with the preparation of 12,000 loaves of bread, in order to feed 18,000 hungry men. The production of such quantities required 20,000 liters of water and ten tons of flour. Meanwhile, SS First Lieutenant Böhler arrived at the Army Supply Depot in Winnki, six kilometers southeast of Lemberg, in order to acquire fresh meat for the division. This amounted to 147 cattle, 120 pigs, or 240 sheep per day.11

The advance of Hausser's II SS Panzer Corps over two roads placed the 10th SS Division on the left side of Hohenstaufen. The 100th Jäger Division protected the flank on the left wing whereas the 367th Infantry Division secured the right. The replacement battalions from both SS divisions attached to Kruck 585, in Zolkiew, and assigned the task of protecting the northern flank of the Fourth Panzer Army.

The approach march of the division proved especially difficult. For vehicle drivers in particular, the blowing snow and ice made the roads a great challenge and nearly impassable. On 3 April, tanks and vehicles of the division proceeded through the villages of Przemyslany and Brzezany. The reality of war struck home when a vehicle became stuck along a ridgeline behind Lemberg. While the crew waited for the vehicle to be freed, Russian fighter aircraft appeared in the sky. A voice cried out, "Look out! Fighter aircraft!" The aircraft approached at low level, and the men tried vehemently to distance themselves from their vehicles through the knee-deep snow. Machine gun fire danced across the road as the fighters planes roared off. Over the next few days, Russian aircraft attacked more frequently with machine guns, cannon, and bombs. The men of the division quickly understood the necessity of distancing themselves from their vehicles and finding cover. Some were not as fortunate and the first graves appeared along the side of the road.12

Meanwhile, the 367th Infantry Division and 100th Jäger Division began their attacks on 3 April. The 367th Division successfully established a bridgehead across the Narajowka, southeast of Rohatyn, whereas the 100th Jägers established bridgeheads across the Zlota Lipa at Litwinow, 10 km northwest of Podhajce, and at Litiatyn, southeast of Brzezany. Despite delays due to intolerable road conditions, the Grenadier Regiment 974 (367th) captured Meducha, the western city heights and managed to reach Horozanka. The 100th Jäger Division also managed to reach the eastern rim of the woods outside Podhajce. The attacking spearheads occupied northwestern Podhajce and the village of Bekersdorf to the northeast.13

A snowstorm between the Dnjestr and the Seret Rivers offered the Germans a brief respite from Soviet aircraft and, more importantly, the opportunity for the Luftwaffe to deliver supplies. Unfortunately, of the 94 supply containers dropped amidst the fighting by air, only six were recovered. On 4 April, the ground froze overnight and movement continued as rear echelon troops of Korpsgruppe Breith reached the Zbrucz River. The 1st Panzer Division made good progress on the attack and the 7th Panzer Division attacked against the important Chertkov-Buczacz road. Korpsgruppe Chevallerie covered the northern flank west of the Seret and prevented Soviet access to the river as units of the Fourth Panzer Army counterattacked along the Strypa towards Buczacz. While strong German forward elements seized the Czortkow-Buczacz road, Korpsgruppe Breith seized crossings over the Strypa and opened crossings at Buczacz from the south. Destroying the bridges over the Dnjestr provided protection along the southern flank. With only 50 kilometers, remaining before the breakout the corps experienced bridging problems. At the same time, Zhukov tried to out-flank Korpsgruppe Breith with the redirected 11th Guard Tank Corps across the Dnjestr and to the north. Even so, Korpsgruppe Breith destroyed thirty-five Soviet tanks of the 11th Guard and fought it back across the Dnjestr.14

The objective of the II SS Panzer Corps was to attack to the southeast along the line Rohatyn-Brzezany, and then strike the Russians south of Podhajce and push through Monasterzyska to Buczacz. Advancing towards Podhajce, the most noticeable adversary remained below freezing temperatures, blowing snow, ice and mud. Entire convoys stopped for hours to assist a single vehicle. Digging, pushing, and pulling reopened the roadway for about an hour, until the next vehicle became stuck. The 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 reached Brzezany around 0500 hours on 4 April. Tanks of the 2nd platoon, many of which became stuck or slid off the road, closed with the main formation throughout the day. By the evening of 4 April, 57 trains arrived carrying units of the 10th SS Panzer Division. Twenty-four hours later, the division was at full strength, minus the SS-Pz.Jgr.Abt.10 and the I./SS-Pz,Rgt.10. As such, with several vehicles needing repair, the division reported combat ready 32 Pz.Kpfw.IV and 38 StuG IIIs.15

In the morning hours on 5 April, the 100th Jäger-Division succeeded in pushing the Soviets out of portions of Podhajce and secured a crossing over the Koropiec stream. The SS-Pz.Aufkl.Abt.10 received orders to reconnoiter the approach to Buczacz and protect a weak spot on the left flank of the division, in the sector north of Buczacz-Wisnioczyk, and establish a bridgehead over the Strypa. Around 1300 hours, armored half-tracks from scout detachments managed to reach the southern banks of the stream after crossing over a ford. A 12-ton auxiliary bridge was built across the Koropiec stream by the afternoon. While the 100th Jäger Division continued to advance in a southerly direction, the 10th SS Panzer Division began its attack at 1215 hours. The SS-Pz.Aufk.Abt.10 attacked directly to the south and southeast, down the middle of the funnel-shaped front of the 100th Jäger Division.

Of the three scout detachments, the 1st and 2nd Scouting Troops radioed the presence of a defensive blocking position, consisting of a Soviet anti-tank line, at the fork in the road southeast of Podhajce. In order to envelope the defenses, the 1st Scout Troop bypassed the line 1 km to the north until two vehicles became mired in the mud. Around 1700 hours, the 3./SS-Pz.Aufkl.Abt.10, commanded by SS First Lieutenant Gerhard Hinze, was reinforced with two cannon platoons and one anti-tank platoon, the Scout Troop Hofmann and the bulk of the reconnaissance battalion that bypassed the anti-tank line and captured Madzelowka. Albeit the bulk of the Russians managed to escape across the Strypa at Osowce, the reinforced 3./SS-Pz.Aufkl.Abt.10 continued the attack and captured Kurdwanowka. By 2100 hours, the village of Osowce and the intact bridge across the Strypa were in German hands. Scout Troop Küffner relentlessly pursued fleeing Russians back across the Strypa until ordered to reinforce the bridgehead. The remainder of the reconnaissance battalion closed with the bridgehead as far as Kurwanowka, and the divisional tank companies took their turn crossing the ford at Podhajce.16

The Soviets were mindful of the strategic importance of Podhajce, which served as a stepping-stone to all future operations. Russian aircraft bombed and strafed the city to stop the German advance. However, Treuenfeld himself was on the ground vehemently directing the flow of traffic. The German armored attack began between 1700-1800 hours. Cautiously, the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 approached the Russian AT line. When the Russians opened fire on the lead tank, ten Russian AT guns, emplaced along the road, were destroyed or overrun during the attack. Bernhard Westerhoff referred to it as a "real night-time battle." The Germans sustained no casualties, however, Russian infantry persistently attacked individual tanks from positions on either side of the road. In this regard, SS First Lieutenant Stock, of the 8th Sturmgeschütz Company reported,

SS Second Lieutenant Hans-Dietrich Sauter, the adjutant of the I./SS-Pz.Art.Rgt.10 and temporary 15 cm "Hummel" battery chief, brought his self propelled battery into position at Podhajce to support the attack against Monasterzyska. The men prepared their battery positions by the book. Every artilleryman was required to dig a hole deep enough to accommodate one man. To his bewilderment, Sauter observed how German soldiers were reluctant to dig holes deep enough. On the other hand, Russian fighting holes encountered within captured positions were the absolute finest examples.18

After Hitler awarded Manstein the Swords to the Knight's Cross on 30 March, General-Feldmarschall (Field Marshal) Walter Model took command of Heeresgruppe Süd on 2 April. Renamed to Heeresgruppe Nordukraine, Model ordered a change for the relief of the encircled army. Somewhat behind schedule, Model ordered the II SS Panzer Corps to form at Podhajce and attack to the southeast.19

The commander of I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21, SS Major Heinz Laubscheer, received orders to attack the village of Kowalowka. Heinz Laubscheer was born on 23 February 1913 in Marburg. After receiving a commission on 20 April 1936, from the officer's school at Braunschweig, Laubscheer attended a platoon commander's course at Dachau before he posted as the adjutant, SS-Oberabschnitt "Elbe." He served for one year at the SS main office and first assumed command of a combat formation in 1 May 1938. As a company commander in the regiment "Germania", he participated in the campaign against Poland and France. After being wounded in the left shoulder on 24 May 1940, he posted as a tactics instructor to the officer's school at Bad Tölz. Returning to a combat unit, he commanded the SS Guard Battalion "Berlin" of the Leibstandarte SS "Adolf Hitler", as part of Kampfgruppe Schuldt on the Eastern Front. By the time he arrived to command the first battalion, SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21, his decorations included the Iron Cross 2nd and 1st Class, the Infantry Assault Clasp, the War Merit Badge 2nd Class, and the Wound Badge in Black. On 19 December 1942, Laubscheer distinguished himself leading the remnants of "battalion Laubscheer" (SS Guard Battalion LSSAH) when a portion of the Italian Army, situated along the Don River, was overrun by Russian troops. Kampfgruppe Schuldt counterattacked east of Meschkoff to regain the dominating heights. In close combat, "battalion Laubscheer" led the fight and defeated a Russian regiment. Battalion Laubscheer held the heights until their last shot was expended and long enough to allow both the German and Italian troops to withdraw in good order. The next day, after 14-days of fighting and breaking out of an encirclement, Laubscheer discovered that approximately 100 men from his battalion were left behind. With three junior lieutenants and 10 men, Laubscheer drove 60 km back behind enemy lines to find the men. When Laubscheer arrived at the abandoned German positions, they discovered the men withdrew on their own accord. On 31 December, Laubscheer personally led a scouting party 15 km ahead of his own forces and made contact with the 11th Panzer Division. Thus, he established the prerequisite for the Kampfgruppe to disengage from the pocket. For the achievements of Laubscheer, the commander of the Kampfgruppe Schuldt, SS Colonel Hinrich Schuldt, was awarded the Oakleaves to the Knight's Cross on 2 April 1942.20

Notes

1. SS-Kriegsberichter-Zuges der 10.SS-Panzer-Div. "Frundsberg", Dran Drauf und Durch! 12. Details on the history and splitting of Poland between Russia and Germany in 1939 were derived from Herbert Fürbringer, 9.SS-Panzer-Division "Hohenstaufen", 172-176, and Glenn E. Curtis, Poland: a country study, 35-38. Under Soviet control from 1939 to 1941, over 1.5 million Poles were moved to labor camps throughout the Soviet Union. The most notorious incident during the Soviet reign of terror included the murder of 4,000 Polish officers, discovered in 1943 by the Germans in the Katyn Forest. After the Germans invaded, Poland became the predominant killing ground of the holocaust with three major death camps to include Auschwitz, Majdanek, and Treblinka. Nearly all 3 million Polish Jews died.

2. For more information regarding the general strategic situation on the Eastern Front and the development of the pocket at Kamenez-Podolsk, see Paul Carell, Verbrannte Erde: Schlacht zwischen Wolga und Weichsel, (Berlin: Deutsche Buch-Gemeinschaft), 387-404, and Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag Junker und Dünnhaupt KG, 1955, reprint Bonn: Athenäum-Verlag 1957), 582-619.

3. Six and a half divisions, surrounded at Tscherkassy at the beginning of February 1944, were able to avoid the earlier fate of Sixth Army. While the majority of the units survived, most of the heavy equipment did not come out of the pocket because of the weather. The divisions then were taken out of the line for rest. For more details on Tscherkassy, see Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, 582-584. For the disposition of Russian forces, see David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clash: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, (Kansas: University Press, 1995), 188-89.

4. David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle, (London: England, 1991), 134-136.

5. Carell, Verbrannte Erde, 397. See also Percy Schramm, KTB: OKW; 1944-45, Book 7, Part 1, p. 12. Actually, several Sturmgeschütz battalions and one infantry division transferred to the east before Hitler stripped the reserve from OB West. Surviving Kampfgruppen from decimated panzer divisions, earmarked for raising new divisions in the west, were never released from the Russian Front and delayed the reinforcement of the west.

6. By 17 April, Heeresgruppe Nordukraine was commanded by Model, not Manstein. See Glantz, When Titans Clash, pp. 189-90.

7. Carell, Verbrannte Erde, 399.

8. The Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 63 required that supply elements of both divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps were available. As a result, the 10th SS provided their support personnel and 20 field stoves for three days. For a complete review of the order, see Klapdor, Die Entscheidung, 21-23. See also Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, 19.

9. Westerhoff, Der Weg einer Panzer Kompanie, 40-41.

10. SS-Kriegsberichter-Zuges, Dran Drauf Durch! 15, Kriegstagebuch (KTB) der 6./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10 "Frundsberg," compiled by SS Second Lieutenant Quandel, NA/RG352/R152/F3794563, and Westerhoff, Der Weg einer Panzer Kompanie, 42.

11. Suchdienst Frundsberg, Divisiongeschichte 'Frundsberg', Die Hellebarde, Nr. 14, 1991, 93-94.

12. SS-Kriegsberichter-Zuges, Dran Drauf Durch! 14-15, KTB, 6./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10, F3794563, and Westerhoff, Der Weg einer Panzer Kompanie, 41-42.

13. Erwin Klapdor, Die Entscheidung, 24-25.

14. There were almost no shortages of fuel and ammunition thanks to the efforts of Gen. Friedrich-Wilhelm Morzik's 2nd Transport who delivered supplies night after night. Comparatively, the Soviets were incapable of after-dark operations, whereas the Germans capitalized on their ability to move materiel in this way. For a detailed report on the air operations in the pocket, see Generalmajor Friedrich-Wilhelm Morzik, German Air Force Airlift Operations, USAF Historical Studies: No. 167 (USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, June 1961). See also Will-Feodor von Neumann von Schmiedeberg von Winckler and Dieter Stenger, Fahnenjunker Frontbewährung: The Eyewitness Account of a German Officer Candidate on the Eastern Front 1943-1944, (Spotsylvania: Stenger Historica Publishing, 2000), 59, and Klapdor, Die Entscheidung, 24-25.

15. According to Klapdor, the KTB of the Pz.AOK 4 reported the 10th SS-Pz.Div. having only 32 Pz.Kpfw.IV and 38 StuG III on 4 April. See Klapdor, Die Entscheidung, 26, Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Year of the War, 24-25, SS-Kriegsberichter-Zuges, Dran Drauf Durch! 15, KTB, 6./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10, NA/RG352/R152/F3794563, and Westerhoff, Weg einer Panzer Kompanie, 42.

16. Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, 27-28. Also consulted the personnel dossier of SS First Lieutenant Gerhard Hinze, SS-Pz.Aufkl.Abt.10, Abt.Gef.St., 5 Aug 1944, Vorschlag für die Verleihung des Deutschen Kreuz in Gold, NA/RG242/A3343/SSO-100A/F189-195.

17. SS-Kriegsberichter-Zuges, Dran Drauf Durch! 15, KTB, 6./SS-Panzer-Regiment 10, F3794563, and Westerhoff, Weg einer Panzer Kompanie, 42. The dates of the first encounter between Russian AT guns and the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10, contained in the KTB 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10, conflict with both those of Tieke and Klapdor, whereby the latter is the most reliable.

18. Suchdienst Frundsberg, Die Hellebarde, Nr. 21, 13-16. According to Sauter, the loss of German materiel would have been far greater if Russian pilots were more skilled.

19. Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, 28.

20. Letter from Heinz Harmel to the adjutant, Reichsführer SS, Div.Gef.St. dated 13.12.1944, "Vorschlag zur Verleihung des D.K.i.G. an SS-Stubaf. Laubscheer, Kdr.SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21." See the personnel dossier of Heinz Laubscheer, NA/RG242/A3343/SSO-245A/F399-523. According to Harmel, the commanding general of the XXVII Army Corps, General Ostfelder, wrote a letter to Himmler recognizing Laubscheer's actions. Cross-referenced with the profile on Hinrich Schuldt found in Krätschmer, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS, 276-77.

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