Frundsberg Division Logo

The Combat History of the
10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg"

Chapter 1

Page 3

Organization and Training

On 7 August 1943, the I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21. boarded trains at Dax for shipment and relocation. The following day the battalion arrived in Rognac, 20 km north of Aix. The battalion staff was located in Saint Cannat. For the battalion, SS Second Lieutenant Pfeil assumed the duties as Adjutant. On 15 Aug 1943, the regiment was placed on "alert level II". Throughout the night, the battalion moved to a new location in anticipation of Allied airborne troops. The battalion was on full alert. Two days later, English and American aircraft attacked an airfield that lay near the battalion staff.41

Meanwhile, on 20 August 1943, the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10 traveled from Souprosse along the Spanish border and Mediterranean coast to the Etang de Berre, a large body of water northwest of Marseille. The charm of the tropics [sic], with high temperatures and never before seen vegetation, required a new service uniform. The men were issued green shirts in place of the black tank jacket and sleeve rank insignia was introduced. Here, the men were quartered in sheep stalls and received the first vehicle for training, a Pz.Kpfw.III. Lacking additional vehicles, the two battalions shared the vehicle for technical and practical training applications, whereby basic infantry training continued. Radio operators also joined the company that arrived from radio training companies stationed in the alpine village of Cornillon, in close proximity to St. Chamas-Miramas.42

For many of the men of the 6./SS-Pz.Rgt.10, the local melons were unfamiliar nutrition. The plentiful fruit, supplemented with grapes, was a novelty, but it caused acute diarrhea among the entire company. “Latrine commandos” dug new latrines almost daily for sanitary purposes. Individuals that were caught stealing extra rations made up the numerous commandos. During this period, radio operators joined the company from a radio company quartered in the mountain village of Cornillon, located near St.Chamas-Miramas. The 2nd platoon under the leadership of R. Henn attached to the II Battalion, and the chief radio operator for the 6th Company was A. Wieser.

The pioneer company, SS-Pz.Rgt.10, relocated to the area around Pau and subsequently moved to Miramas, near St. Chamas, where the company quartered in former Army barracks. Chamas was located on the Etang de Berre; the center of the French petroleum industry. The training emphasized field maneuvers and building secondary bridges. The bridges were later turned over to the villagers who showed their gratitude by serving food and wine in the village square. The German soldiers established a good relationship with the French civilians.43

On 22 August, the I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21 received a warning order for the relocation of the regiment. The battalion arrived in its new area for billeting after a forced march without a single casualty in personnel or equipment. One week later the battalion went on alert due to the imminent deployment and engagement of the battalion in the area of Marseilles and Toulon. A motorized Columns was organized.44

From the end of August until the latter part of September, the pioneer platoon of the 5./SS-Aufk.Abt.10, bivouacked in tents in Merle. During this period, Italy capitulated and joined the Allies. On 24 September, the entire reconnaissance battalion was transferred to an area northeast of Marseille. The 5th Company resided in Aubagne and received its full complement of half-tracks.45

On 1 September 1943, the I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21 awarded the War Merit Cross 2nd Class with Swords to:

SS-Oscha. Schreiter
SS-Oscha. Tanner
SS-Uscha. Kiefer
SS-Uscha. Rid
SS-Uscha. Jäckel

The War Merit Cross was instituted to recognize service in the furtherance of the war effort that fell short of the award of the Iron Cross.

The battalion left their quarters around Mas de Payan and relocated, on 8 September, into their old quarters around Saint Cannat. This relocation provided an excellent opportunity for training. The first three companies marched to their objective, whereas the 4th Company and the staff were mechanized. No casualties were reported. Four battalion NCOs received orders to the 5th Special Inter-Service Course at the SS Pioneer School at Hradischko from 13 September to 10 October 1943.

Around 17 September, due to inclement weather, the companies moved from the outside into quarters. The 1st and 3rd companies occupied Lambesc, the 2nd Company moved into Eguilles, and the 4th Company billeted in St. Cannat. After a long period on the alert, the battalion conducted field exercises on 23 September. Participants and observers included the commander of southern France, General Georg von Sodenstern, Debes, Oberstleutnant von Jansen, as well as the regimental and individual battalion commanders. The scenario for the training exercise was to “attack after preparatory positions.” In support of the exercise, the I Battalion of the artillery regiment, the 2nd Company of the assault gun artillery battalion, and an attack squadron from the 2nd Flieger-Division were attached to the battalion. At the conclusion of the exercise, General Sondenstern addressed the battalion and spoke highly of the SS-Sturmbannführer (SS Major) Laubscheer. Rounding out the remainder of the month, Gropp led the battalion for a night exercise around Lambesc. The exercise scenario was “entering the assembly area.”

According to Hans-Dieter Sauter, the battery commander for the 1st Battery, SS-Pz.Art.Rgt.10, the regimental commander, SS Colonel Hans Sander, was a failure. After gunnery training near St. Cannat, France, Sauter evaluated the training. In front of the entire battery, Sander discredited Sauter and the battery. However, a general Army officer was present as well, patted Sander on the shoulder and said, "Herr Oberst, the Lieutenant is right. His decision prevented a greater catastrophe. I wish I had enough such Lieutenants in my Division." The following day, Sauter was summoned to the regimental command post. First, the Regimental Adjutant, SS Captain Heinzelmann, admonished Sauter, and then Sander took his turn. However, Sauter remained calm. As a reservist he did not have the pressure of adding a star (pip) to his collar tabs every year.

Several days later, the alarm was sounded. The High Command feared imminent American landing operations along the coast around Marseille and orders arrived directing the regiment to the coast. At such time, the ranking officer at the regimental staff quarters, in Pelisanne, was the 1st Ordnance Officer, SS First Lieutenant Dr. Sumper. Sander and his adjutant were purportedly in Nizza, visiting members of the regiment at the field hospital. According to Hans Ligner, the division Ia, Sander never went to the hospital.46

For the most part of October, the battalion continued intensive combat training. In the afternoon on 1 October, SS First Lieutenant Krauß conducted a class in the field for all platoon commanders and NCOs on the “counterattack of a battalion in reserve to re-establish a critical situation.” Several days later, the I Battalion assigned judges for the II Battalion field exercise that took place in Lambesc. The battalion staff, company and platoon commanders received training on the use of command radios and signals for the scenario, “attack after assembly phase.” SS Second Lieutenant Pfeil led the training that took place within the battalion. The 3./Sturmgesch.Art.Abt.10 attached to the battalion for instructional purposes between 8-10 October. This aspect of cross training was carried out with the greatest interest and enthusiasm. However, SS Grenadier Haueis died a day after his foot was squashed between the tracks while mounting a vehicle.47

Before the end of the first week in October, the SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 10, commanded by SS Major Brinkmann, received its remaining vehicles that placed the battalion at full strength.48

From 9-15 October, the I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21 sent a number of individuals to a variety of training classes, to include twenty-five students and four instructors to the NCO class at the SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21 in le Puy; SS First Lieutenant Krauß attended a field exercise with the II./Pz.Rgt.10; SS First Lieutenant Lösken attended training classes at the reserve Grenadier-Regiment 181 in Orleans; and ten NCOs and forty-three men attended classes for combating tanks in close combat, flamethrowers, mines, and building emplacements at the Army pioneer school in Cosne/Nievre.

At 0030 hours on 23 October, the regiment telephoned the battalion with the message,

"The division is being moved into a new area. The battalion shall depart as the first transport. Embarkation time 0930-1730 hours. Time of departure, 1800 hours. Embarkation railroad station- Aix."

The relocation of the battalion was executed using two transports over Lyon, Versailles, and to Montfort (debarkation railroad station for the 1st transport) and Bernay (2nd transport). No casualties or losses of equipment were reported.49

Major changes transformed the panzer grenadier division when it reorganized into a regular SS panzer division. The daily order, number 1632/43, dated 26 October 1943, stipulated that the pioneer and construction companies of the SS-Pz.Rgt.10 organize pioneer platoons for the I "Panther" Battalion. Excess pioneers were to be absorbed into the 10th SS-Pioneer Battalion. A flamethrower platoon was authorized to organize for the headquarters company, SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21. Both motorcycle companies from the grenadier regiments, to include all their equipment, weapons and ammunition were to transfer to the SS-Pz.Aufk.Abt.17 of the SS-Panzer-Grenadier-Division "Götz von Berlichingen." However, the company commanders were to remain with the 10th SS. The 4th Company of the reconnaissance battalion was to equip with Schwimmwagen (the amphibious version of the Kübelwagen or German Jeep). The equipping of the SS-Stug.Gesch.Abt.10 (assault gun battalion) was contingent on a special order, after a review by the inspector general of the tank troops. The III./SS-Art.Rgt.10 and all their equipment, weapons and ammunition, also transferred to the 17th SS-Pz.Gren.Div., whereas shortages in personnel for the self-propelled battalion were to be made up through the SS main office. The divisional observer battery remained under tactical control of the division until the general staff of the VII SS Panzer Corps was organized. At such time, the battery transferred to the corps. A light squadron of the 10th SS-Flak-Abt. was ordered organized after completion of the reorganization of the division. Bridge Columns were organic components of engineer battalions. Bridging equipment types B and K supported normal traffic of 24-tons. Type B was a pontoon trestle bridge, whereas type K was a box girder bridge supported on pontoons and trestles. Bridging equipment J was for supporting tanks. For the Frundsberg Division, Bridging Column B was ordered reorganized to Bridging Column K, and the delivery of equipment for the general organization of Bridging Column J was authorized. The supply units were expected to reorganize on their own, whereby the theoretical strength of the entire division was to near 90 percent. Excess personnel were to be reported to the SS main office for further use and the reorganization of the division was expected completed by 20 November 1943.50

On 24 September 1943, the OKH (Army High Command) directed that all panzer divisions convert to the new table of organization "PzDiv43". The 10th SS Panzer Grenadier Division reorganized to a panzer division that followed the format outlined by the Army on 4 October 1943. In theory, the organization of an SS division resembled that of an army panzer division, with the exception of two reinforced panzer grenadier regiments. A panzer regiment, a single artillery regiment, a reconnaissance, anti-tank, pioneer, anti-aircraft, signals, and replacement battalion, and supply and medical units made up the remainder of the division.51

There is much confusion surrounding the exact number of authorized tanks for a German SS panzer division. The number of tanks in an SS division was identical to that in an army division. It is important to understand that the 1943-pattern division, established on 4 October 1943, provided for a margin of flexibility by prescribing three to four companies of seventeen to twenty-two tanks each. The published total numbers of tanks, in October 1943, reflect calculations based on seventeen tanks, in each of the three companies, in the Panther Battalion (I). The total number equals fifty-one tanks in the I Battalion. The published figures for the II Battalion, equipped with seventeen Pz.Kpfw.IVs in each of the four companies, total sixty-eight tanks. The numbers accurately reflect the equipment totals for a 1943-pattern panzer division, as specified in the OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt./Nr.I/ 4500/43 gKdos v.4.10.43. Nevertheless, the actual number of companies in the I Battalion was four, and the authorized strength was actually twenty-two tanks per company. In 1943, the I Battalion did not receive any Panther tanks. Theoretically, seven flamethrower tanks were alloted to the II Battalion. When the 1944-pattern panzer division was outlined by the Army High Command on 15 August 1944, the regimental staff and both the battalions staff companies received additonal tanks. The regimental staff was equipped with three command Panther tanks and five additional Panthers. The Panther Battalion staff company consisted of eight additional Panthers, and the same was true for the II Battalion Staff Company that was allocated eight additional Pz.Kpfw.IV. Therefore, the 10th SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg" received twenty-two Pz.Kpfw.IV tanks for both the 5th and 6th Companies. Due to a shortage of tanks, both the 7th and 8th Companies received twenty-two assault guns. These numbers, however, differ substantively from sources that provide theoretical numbers. After mid-August 1944, each of the four companies containing twenty-two tanks total eighty-eight tanks. Adding the tanks of the command and staff company, an SS division was authorized 104 Panthers and ninety-six Pz.Kpfw.IV.52

The Panzerkampfwagen IV Ausf H (SdKfz 161/2) or medium tank IV Model H, evolved from a Krupp design 20-ton class support tank. First produced in 1937, the Pz.Kpfw.IV underwent seven revisions by April 1943. Produced by Krupp-Gruson, Vomag, and Nibelungwerke, the 5-man crew H-model tank weighed twenty-five tons and powered by the Maybach HL 120 TRM engine. The V-12 engine produced 300 horsepower at 3,000 rpm. The H-varient tank also featured the SSG77 transmission and reached speeds of 38 kmh with a range of 210 kilometers. Communications made possible with the FuG5 radio set, a 10-watt transmitter c, and the USW receiver c1, which operated in the frequency ranges of 27,200-33,300 Kc/s and a maximum range of 4 kilometers. The front hull was protected by 80mm of steel, whereas the sides consisted of 30mm, the rear of 20mm, and top of 10mm. The turret was manufactured with 50mm in the front, 30mm on the sides, 30mm in the rear, and 15mm on the top. The superstructure was fitted with 80mm in the front, 30mm on the sides, 20mm in the rear, and 12mm on the top. For added protection, the sides of the hull and turret carried supplementary steel plates of 5mm and 8mm respectively. The main gun, a Kampfwagen Kanone KwK40L/48, the second longest 7,5 cm gun of 48 calibers, was intended as an anti-tank gun and to fire high explosive ammunition. The muzzle velocity of the gun reached 790 meters per second and could penetrate 64mm of homogeneous armor plate at 2,000 meters. The ball-mounted machine gun MG34 was equipped with a Kugel Zielfernrohr 2 (ZgZF2) that used a monocular magnification of 1.75 for a range of 200 meters. The main gun used a turret sighting telescope or Turm Zielfernrohr 5f/1 (TZF5f/1) using a monocular magnification of 2.4 for a range of 1,200 meters for the coaxial machine gun MG34, 3,000 for armor piercing ammunition, 1,500 armor piercing, and 4,000 meters for high explosive ammunition. The vehicle carried eighty-seven rounds of AP, HE, and smoke ammunition. German ammunition was highly developed as well. The armor-piercing projectile (Panzer Granate) was capped to improve performance against face-hardened armor, and capped again with a ballistic cap improve long-range performance.53

At each level of command, whether for the division, regiment, battalion, or company, the individual staff functioned as an apparatus of the commander who made all the decisions and took full responsibility for the unit. The adjutant, the commander's representative, led the staff in general terms. The commander of the SS tank regiment, SS-Obersturmbannführer (SS Lieutenant Colonel) Otto Paetsch, theorized that simplistic and tight leadership with a rigid scope of work for each department and close working relationships were fundamental to a cohesive staff. Moreover, taking personal pride in their work, a sense of responsibility, planning, and independency allowed a staff to perform their work most efficiently. The primary responsibility of each and every member of the staff was the welfare of the troops.

Each staff was organized into six sections, denoted by a sequential roman numbering system, and each department had several areas of responsibilities. The Ia, or adjutant, was employed to effect the will of the commander. During combat, neither the commander nor the adjutant were to be away from their posts at the same time. The adjutant's responsibilities included informing the commander of all matters concerning the regiment, and the commander was obligated to inform the adjutant of all directives. The adjutant answered any questions regarding tactical operations and ensured that all orders of the day were carried out while marching, in combat, or bivouac. Correspondence as a whole, with the exception of secret mail and that of the general commands, was opened by the combat correspondent and provided to the adjutant for delivery to the individual battalions. Only the commander signed all unit (regimental) correspondence for the division and other units. All other reports and orders were to be routed and signed via the adjutant and prepared to the commander by 0800 hours the next day.

The Ib was responsible for the overall supply of the unit, whereas the Ic oversaw intelligence. The adjutant was to be apprised of all matters concerning intelligence. The IIa and IIb were responsible for all matters concerning the officer corps, promotions, transfers, replacements and assignments. The III section concerned itself with legal affairs. The IVa section made recommendations to the commander concerning administrative matters. The IVb, or unit doctor, concerned itself with the medical well being of the troops. The V section was responsible for the repair and equipping of items from the motor vehicular maintenance workshop. The last section, VI, oversaw unit training and propaganda, troop welfare, and officer burials. The following table of organization identifies the individual billets for the tank regiment:

Command Section:
Regimental commander

Leading the Troops (Adjutant)
Tactical Orders
Tactical Measures Combat Correspondent:
Organization Training Instruction (individual classes)


Ordnance Officer I
Commanders Aid
Combat Reports
War Diary
Routing Orders
Messenger Squadron
Biological Defense

Enemy Intelligence Service
Enemy Situation Maps
Enemy Reconnaissance (air and ground)
Enemy Information
Acquisition through special methods Intelligence (sabotage, espionage, counter- intelligence)
Special Occasions
Inspection of Secret-Material (under lock)

Weapons and Equipment
Evaluation of BAV for troops

Matters concerning officer
Promotions, Transfers
Personal matters concerning the commander
Registrar; central office for written correspondence and daily orders

Matters concerning NCOs
Matters concerning the troops
Promotions, Transfers
Questions concerning Recruiting/Replacement

Disciplinary Punishments and Matters concerning complaints
Military Courts
Martial Case Reports

Economy and Planning
Fiscal Studies/Testing
Requirements for Troops
Market Analysis/Changes

Regimental Doctor
Medical Service for the Troops
Epidemic Prevention
Medical Training
Guarding Troop Hygiene

Motor Vehicles:
Motor Vehicle Maintenance
Quality Control/Testing
Motor vehicle Advisor for officers
Motor vehicle training Recruiting/Replacements

Ideological Training/Propaganda:
Preparation for Propaganda
Burial Concerns

Communications Officer:
Communications Service
Radio Operator Training

Ordnance Officer II:
Supply of Troops in Combat (in conjunction with Ib)
Determination of Fortified Positions
Regimental Situational Liaison

In combat, the tank command vehicles (Panzer-Befehlswagen) provided the following functions:

Regimental Commander's Tank:
Leading the Troops
Tactical Orders
Tactical Directives
Communication with superior and subordinate commands

Regimental Adjutant's Tank:
The same responsibilities as the commander's but also Supply of ammunition and fuel

Repair service Ordnance Officer's Tank:
Supply of ammunition and fuel Repair service Air liaison.54

The seven-day training schedule for the staff company of the assault gun battalion, from 4-11 October 1943, allotted more than three and a quarter hours of maintenance or vehicle training per day for five days (M-F), totaling 16.25 hours a week. Training for drill received 45 minutes per day for four days (M-T), whereby some form of combat training was conducted for two to two and a half hours, seven days a week (M-S), totaling approximately 14 hours. Evenings were reserved for special projects that included singing. At 1800 hours on Saturday, an inspection was held to conclude the training week, and Sunday was a day off. However, the same was not true for the 2./StuG.Abt.10 in November 1943, when training continued right through Sunday, albeit beginning somewhat later from 0830 hours until noon, consisting of 45 minutes indoctrination training (see appendix for an overview of the training plans).55

On 28 October, the 10th SS Panzer Division relocated to Normandy and the association to the historical figure, Georg von Frundsberg, was forever cemented on 4 November 1943.56

When the pioneer battalion relocated to Normandy by rail, disaster struck during the night when the advanced party passed through Dijon. Hugo Benger, of the 3./SS-Pz.Pi.Btl.10, played a hand of Skat (card game) as the rail cars hurtled through the night, rocking softly back and forth. Suddenly, the screeching sound of steel pierced the night as the wheels of the train locked and braked. Benger recalls, "As if by the hand of ghosts, the doors tore wide open, luggage spilled from stowage compartments, and bodies flew through the air." The train then lunged forward but braked again, screeching until it stopped. Outside, whistling steam and mounting chaos filled the night. After warning-troops were sent to the back to stop other trains that followed, Benger made his way forward where the mangled bodies of men from the 2nd Company were brought out on shelter halves. An enraged company commander held two elderly Frenchmen at gunpoint that were later determined to be railroad shift workers. The locomotive lay half way on its side and dug itself between the rails into the ground, up to the midsection of the boiler. Steam spewed from torn pipes and hot coal was strewn from the open fire pit. The first few rail cars were piled on top of one another and formed a steeple-like wreck. Within the twisted steel, the misfortunate and dead were easily recognizable by their camouflage jackets. Some seriously injured men were found in other cars, but nothing could be done to help them in and among the wreck. Afterwards, Benger surveyed the railroad line and discovered where railroad tracks were loosened on a bridge. The fact that saboteurs moved the rails to the outside prevented an even greater catastrophe. Once a recovery train arrived in the early morning on the neighboring track, the men boarded the transport train and continued their journey towards Normandy. The battalion unloaded south of Dieppe at Pont Audemer, and occupied quarters to the west and southwest of the village.57

An armored half-track training staff, comprised of an Army officer and five Army NCOs, arrived on 4 Nov at the I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21. On 6 November the divisional Abt.VI (indoctrination branch) released the historical background on Georg von Frundsberg. The following day, the battalion hosted an hour of celebration in observance of 9 November 1923, the day of Hitler's failed putsch. The regimental music platoon attended the event that concluded with a commander's review of the battalion.

Throughout the next several days the battalion continued cross training and sent men to various different units. Six NCOs attended training at the reconnaissance battalion. The commander of the 3rd Company, SS First Lieutenant Vogl, transferred to the SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.22 and SS Second Lieutenant Krüger assumed the command. On 10 November, the battalion commander accompanied the divisional commander for training with Panther and Tiger tank units in Mailly Le Camp.

An escort commando dispatched to Berlin on 14 November to pick up thirty-three armored halftracks. The Commanding General, LXXXI Army Corps, General der Panzertruppen Adolf Kuntzen, and General der Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, General der Panzertruppen West, made a surprise visit to the battalion on 16 November. The following day, the battalion commander accompanied the regimental and division commanders for training for the 9th SS-Pz.Div., and SS-Unterführer (SS NCO) Teschow attended a short photo training session with the Luftwaffe in Brüssel, Belgium.

Twenty-five additional armored halftracks, along with instructors, arrived for I Battalion and distributed to the 1st and 3rd Companies. Driving school began on 22 November. Two days later, Debes accompanied the Army Lieutenant General Josef Reichert, commander of the 711th Infantry-Division, for a group field exercise of the 1st Company.58

Another commando dispatched to Elbing and Spandau to pick up additional armored halftracks. On 30 November, SS Lieutenant General Debes ordered I Battalion to conduct a demonstration for General Geyr and other tank officers from surrounding units. Among others, the topics included "combat over terrain with and without observation." The 2nd Company, reinforced by elements of the 1st and 4th Companies and 2./Art.Rgt.10, carried out the "attack of a reinforced company." Despite poor weather, the exercise proceeded well. On 14 December, the battalion received a total of forty-seven armored half-tracks (delivered to Lisieux) and thirty captured Italian trucks. Two additional war games were conducted whose scenarios included "weaving into formation and march" and "attack of a reinforced company while underway." Under the direction of Oberleutnant Sievers, two courses for driving, one Schirrmeister (issue/supply school), and one tank recovery class concluded.59

During November and December, the pioneer battalion buried Dutch landmines (trip-wire type) along the Normandy coast and built beach obstacles, also known as "Rommelspargel." Rommel asparagus referred to any standing obstacles, metal or wood beams, not only confined to the beaches, where they came equipped with Teller or plate mines on the protruding end, but also in the prospective glider and paratroop landing areas further inland. In conversation with Army soldiers stationed in the coastal area, the SS-Pioneers heard negative remarks, to include, for example, that the SS wanted to prevent a withdrawal and to drag out the war.

Additional NCO training emphasized command terminology and using the radio to distribute assignments. Moreover, areas of terrain ideal for airborne landings were reconnoitered and dominating terrain features were incorporated into a fortified rearward defensive system. Protective trenches were dug around the billeting areas and ramparts for the vehicles.60


41. KTB, I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21, NA/RG242/T354/R150/F3792093.

42. Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 19-21. As a result of partisan activity, portions of the company were distributed to guard bridges and key points along the railroad. No incidents with partisans were reported.

43. A report by Erich Werkmeister, Pionier Kameradschaft "Dresden", Chronik der Pioniereinheiten, 10.

44. KTB, I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21, NA/RG242/T354/R150/F3792093.

45. Based on a report by Gerhard Schulz, an NCO in the pioneer platoon, 5./SS-Pz.Aufk.Abt.10, contained in the Pionier Kameradschaft "Dresden", Chronik der Pioniereinheiten, 9. The deployment of the division to southern France resulted from the capitulation of Italy and fear of Allied landings along the south coast of France; see Klapdor, Die Entscheidung, 17.

46. SS-Untersturmführer Hans-Dieter Sauter, "Querschuesse und Intrigen?", Die Hellebarde, no. 21 (2001): 35-36.

47. KTB, I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21, F3792091, and F3792093. In terms of the praise Laubscheer received from General Sodenstern, conflicting reports exist concerning who led the exercise. The KTG entry for 20 Sep 43, which follows sequentially 23 Sep 43, reports Laubscheer leaving the battalion to command the SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.2 (22) from 20 September to 10 October 1943. SS Captain Gropp assumed command of the battalion just days before the exercise began.

48. Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Year of the War, 9-10. See appendix X for the complete table of organization for the reconnaissance battalion.

49. From 9-15 October, records identify units with a single numeral, to include the I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.1, or II./SS-Pz.Rgt.1. In both cases, provisional organizational numbers were used until the units received their final designation. KTB, I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21, NA/RG242/T354/R150/F3792092; and Tieke, In the Firestorm of the Last Years of the War, 10.

50. SS-FHA, Amt II, Org.Abt.Ia/II, Tgb.Nr.16432/43 g.Kdos., dated 26 October 1943, Pionier Kameradschaft "Dresden", Chronik der Pioniereinheiten, 11; and U.S. War Department, Handbook on German Military Forces, with introduction by Stephen Ambrose, (Baton Rouge, LA: 1990), 156 and 507.

51. For a complete table of organization, see appendix XX. See OKH/Gen.St.d.H./Org.Abt./Nr.I/4500/43 gKdos v.4.10.43., as contained in Dr. F.M. v. Senger u. Etterlin, Die Panzer-Grenadiere: Geschichte u. Gestalt der mechanisierten Infanterie 1930-1960, (München: publisher unknown, 1961), 203-204 and 218-220.

52. See 5./SS-Pz.Rgt.10, 1.3.1944, Übergabe-Verhandlung, NA/RG242/T354/R152/F3794742 and 3794751, and Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 26. Also consulted v. Senger u. Etterlin, Die Panzer-Grenadiere, 203-204 and 218-220. For more information concerning the assault gun, see Walter J. Spielberger, Sturmgeschütz & Its Varients, translated by James C. Cable, (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1993), 247. Only the divisions "Wiking", "Hohenstaufen", and "Frundsberg" received 44 StuGs to be distributed between two companies.

53. For more details concerning various German tanks, see Peter Chamberland and Hilary Doyle, Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two: A Complete Illustrated Directory of German Battle Tanks, Armoured Cars, Self-Propelled Guns and Semi-Tracked Vehicles, 1933-1945, revised edition, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993), 98, and 244-256.

54. 10.SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", SS-Pz.Rgt, Rgt.Gef.Std., 13.7.1944, Dienstanweisung für den Stab SS-Panzer-Regiment 10, NA/RG242/T354/R152/F3795129-3795132.

55. 10.SS-Division, (Panzer-Grenadier-Division), Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung, "Wochen- Dienstplan für den Stab SS-Stu.Gesch.Abt.10, für die Zeit vom 4.-11.10.1943," O.U. den 2.10.43, NA/RG242/T354/R150/F3792683-3792684; and 10.SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg" 2./Sturmgeschütz-Abt., "Dienstplan für die Zeit 22.11-28.11.1943," O.U. den 19.11.43, F3792687-3792692.

56. 10.SS Panzer Division "Frundsberg", Abt.VI/Az.37g/Lt./Dr; Div.St.Qu., dtd 6.11.43, NA/RG242/T354/R150/F3791940-791948. For the complete history on Georg von Frundsberg, see Appendix A.

57. Westerhoff, Weg Einer Panzer-Kompanie, 20-22, and Pionier Kameradschaft "Dresden", Chronik der Pioniereinheiten, 8-9.

58. The training regiment number 1 was officially re-designated to Regiment 21 on 6 November 1943. KTB, I./SS-Pz.Gren.Rgt.21, NA/RG242/T354/R150/F3792090. The 711th Infantry Division, commanded by Generalleutnant Josef Reichert, was one of three divisions that formed the LXXXI Army Corps, commanded by General der Panzertruppe Adolf Kuntzen. The other two divisions included the 245th Infantry Division and the 17th Luftwaffe Field Division.

59. Ibid., F3792090 and 792094.

60. Pionier Kameradschaft "Dresden", Chronik der Pioniereinheiten, 8-9. This came as a direct result of Allied air attacks.

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